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European Union citizenship has been interpreted as a multilevel concept that designates the 
membership of individuals in more than one polity, the national and post-national.1 The rich 
literature on the concept of EU citizenship following its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty has 
revolved around the substantive political and social rights deriving therefrom; its potential to 
consolidate and expand the free movement of persons and their integration in the labour 
markets of host Member States; as well as its role in constructing a European identity beyond 
national borders. 2  Two paradigms, in particular, have dominated discourse in the legal 
literature with the objective to explain the function of EU citizenship and its effect in 
structuring the relations between EU citizens, Member States and EU institutions.  
 
First, those who seek greater protection for social rights at the European level argue that the 
function of EU citizenship should be conceptualised in terms of enhancing social solidarity 
between EU nationals and Member States.3 Union citizenship has brought about guarantees 
beyond the economic freedoms, transcending the economic rationality of the internal market 
in order to expand the protection of social rights for EU citizens residing in a Member State 
other than the one of their nationality.4 In this sense, EU citizenship has promoted a degree of 
social solidarity, which derives from ‘the existence of a common identity forged through shared 
social and cultural experiences, and institutional and political bonds’,5 and leads to distributive 
justice in the Union through the protection of EU citizens in need. An evaluation of the extent 
to which social solidarity has been attained in the context of economic integration rests upon 
diverse theoretical traditions regarding citizenship and rights beyond the state; be it driven for 
instance by a cosmopolitan vision of supranational democracy or by a focus on the integrative 
 
* I am thankful to Achilles Skordas, Jiří Přibáň, and Napoleon Xanthoulis for their very helpful comments on 
previous drafts and to Panos Kapotas and Daniel Bedford for the constructive exchange of ideas on the topic. 
1 Rainer Bauböck, ‘The Three Levels of Citizenship in the European Union’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 751; 
Michael Dougan, ‘The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship’ (2006) 31 European 
Law Review 613. For a general overview of the concept, see Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’ in Armin von 
Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010) 433. 
2 Indicatively see Jo Shaw, ‘Sovereignty at the Boundaries of the Polity’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2003) 461; Percy B Lehning, ‘European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity’ 
(2001) 20 Law and Philosophy 239; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in Bart van Steenberg 
(ed), The Condition of Citizenship (SAGE 1994) 20; Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘The New Constitution as European 
“Demoi-cracy”’ (2004) 7 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 76; Katherine E 
Tonkiss, ‘Post-national Citizenship without Post-national Identity? A Case Study of UK Immigration Policy and 
Intra-EU Migration’ (2013) 9 Journal of Global Ethics 35. 
3 Tamara Hervey, ‘Social Solidarity: A Buttress Against Internal Market Law’ in Jo Shaw (ed), Social Law and 
Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing 2000) 31; Síofra O’Leary, ‘Solidarity and Citizenship 
Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in Gráinne de Búrca (ed), EU Law and the 
Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford University Press 2005); Naimh N Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of 
EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1597. 
4 In general, see Alexander Somek, ‘Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship’ (2007) 
University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper Number 07-13; Floris de Witte, ‘EU Law, Politics, and the 
Social Question’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 581; Dion Kramer, ‘Earning Social Citizenship in the European 
Union: Free Movement and Access to Social Assistance Benefits Reconstructed’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 270. 
5 Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa, ‘“Wish You Weren’t Here...”: New Models of Social Solidarity in the 
European Union’ in Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing 
2005) 181, 185. 
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force of the juridification of rights. In broad terms however, at a normative level, EU 
citizenship is viewed as capable of supplementing the free movement of persons with the notion 
of social solidarity of the host Member States towards EU citizens irrespective of their position 
as economically active or inactive actors. At the operational level, and in accordance with 
developing secondary EU law, it could potentially enable economically inactive persons in the 
host State to have a claim to social assistance solely by virtue of their status as Union citizens.  
 
Second, those who focus on the impact of EU citizenship on economic freedoms highlight that 
it has primarily succeeded in increasing the participation of individuals in the internal market.6 
Economic freedoms are constructed as fundamental rights stemming from Union citizenship 
in order to ensure that all citizens can pursue cross-border economic activities and take up 
employment and residence at the Member State of their choice.7 In contrast to the above 
paradigm, EU citizenship does not constitute an independent source of social protection and 
social policy at the Union level nor does it entail an entitlement to access the welfare system 
of the host State. Extension of Union citizenship to encompass non-economic protections may 
derive, for example, from the principle of equal treatment and from secondary EU law. 
Nevertheless, it is envisaged to the extent that such protections facilitate an economic activity 
and integration of economically active persons in the economic and social life of the host State.  
 
Based on this rather ‘thinner’ scope, EU citizenship lacks the potential to promote the 
emergence of a European social identity. Tuori’s construction of the multiple constitutions of 
Europe, for example, highlights the interlinked communicative processes – and not a full-
fledged collective – that shape the constitutional structure of the Union. He identifies in 
particular the absence of a normative vision for a social Europe and explains that one of the 
pivotal aspects of European constitutionalism is that the EU’s economic and social policies 
have so far relied on, and been supplemented by, the redistributive mechanisms and fiscal 
resources of the national welfare systems which have not lost their primacy in delivering 
redistributive policies. 8  Given that the EU develops a networked, heterarchical model of 
governance that encompasses fragmented societal processes of self-organisation, it does not 
produce an overarching ‘common stake’ on which a deep level of social solidarity could be 
grounded.9  This then shifts the focus to a functional conceptualisation of citizenship that 
reflects the overlapping and fluctuating constituencies of the Union’s fragmented social 
systems.  
 
Against this background of the debate regarding the proper function and scope of EU 
citizenship, a rich body of literature has emerged concerning the line of case law of the CJEU 
on economically inactive EU citizens and their entitlement to social assistance since the Dano 
 
6 In general, Alina Tryfonidou, Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms (Hart Publishing 
2016). 
7 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights reinforces this and includes the freedom to choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work (Article 15 which partially supports the free movement of factors of production), the 
freedom to conduct business (Article 16) and the right to property (Article 17). For a variation of this argument, 
see the ‘republican interpretation’ of EU citizenship as a right to participate in the EU’s multilevel governance, 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘EU Citizenship as a Constitutional Restraint on the EU’s Multilevel Governance of 
Public Goods’ EUI Working Paper LAW 2017/12 available at 
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/47505/LAW_2017_12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 
20 April 2020. 
8 Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) 227-268.  
9 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘“We, the European People . . .”—Relâche?’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 147, 158. 
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judgment in 2014.10 In a close interpretation of secondary law on EU citizenship, the Court in 
Dano made explicit that Member States can refuse the provision of social benefits to 
economically inactive persons and persons who do not retain the status of a worker.11 Critical 
accounts of the judicial decisions diagnose a marked shift in the Court’s approach, from an 
expansive to an unjustifiably restrictive interpretation of the rights of economically inactive 
persons and the scope of Union citizenship. For example, Shuibhne has noted that the post-
Dano case law has  ‘induced the systemic spasm that has profoundly altered the legal trajectory 
of citizenship’12 and Spaventa has observed that the CJEU has entered a ‘reactionary phase’ 
and excluded social considerations from the remit of citizenship.13 A point which has been 
overlooked, however, is that much of the debate on Union citizenship and, more specifically, 
the right of economically inactive persons to welfare assistance is anchored in a notion of 
centralised or hierarchical political constitutionalism in the context of which citizenship 
contributes towards the foundation of a social collective order at the supranational level. 
Therefore, the criticisms directed to the relevant cases of the CJEU remain bound within an 
integration model oriented towards the building of Europe as a social state, which is not 
intrinsic to the current constitutional architecture of the Union.14 
In light of this, the main aim of this chapter is to examine the case law on economically inactive 
EU citizens, with a particular focus on the decisions in Dano, Alimanovic,15 Garcia Nieto16 and 
Commission v UK,17 and to explore whether there has been a transformation in the approach of 
the Court. Contrary to the strong criticisms expressed in the academic literature, it is argued 
here that the reasoning of the Court is consistent with its previous decisions. The post-Dano 
case law in particular demarcates and clarifies, rather than overturns, the rights of economically 
inactive persons and thereby, the boundaries of EU citizenship become more visible. More 
importantly, this case law reveals the fault lines of the construct of EU citizenship. The different 
categories of individual status under EU citizenship,18 such as first-time jobseekers, jobseekers 
who have previously been employed in the host State for less than a year and those who have 
worked for more than a year, students, persons with sufficient resources or the economically 
inactive, demonstrate how different treatment is inevitable under secondary EU law, and is, in 
fact, sanctioned by the Lisbon Treaty. Oscillating between the two abovementioned 
irreconcilable paradigms, the Court manages to develop a trajectory of Union citizenship with 
respect to economically inactive persons that fits well within the pluralistic and heterogeneous 
construction of the EU’s constitutional framework.  
 
 
10  Judgment of 11 November 2014, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358 (hereinafter ‘Dano’). 
11 Ibid., paras. 78-80. 
12 Niamh N Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’ (2015) 
52 Common Market Law Review 889. 
13  Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Earned citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship through its Scope’ in Dimitry 
Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017) 204. 
14 See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Validity of the Network Concept’ 
(1997) 3 European Law Journal 33, 40-43. 
15 Judgment of 15 September 2015, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, Case C-67/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 (hereinafter ‘Alimonovic’). 
16 Judgment of 25 February 2016, Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García-Nieto and 
Others, Case C-299/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:114 (hereinafter ‘Garcia-Nieto’).  
17  Judgment of 14 June 2016, European Commission v UK and Northern Ireland, Case C-308/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:436 (hereinafter ‘Commission v UK’). 
18 See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Right of Citizens of the Union 
and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States (29 April 2004) 
OJ L/158/77 [hereinafter ‘CRD’ or ‘Directive’]. 
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In order to evaluate the approach of the CJEU, it is necessary to place the discussion within the 
wider constitutional structures of the Union and to provide an explanatory framework that can 
offer an account for these judgments, as well as the degree of consistency they demonstrate 
with previous decisions and secondary EU law. The chapter draws insights from the systems 
theoretical approach focusing on the functional differentiation of social systems, such as the 
economy, politics and law, that can help illustrate the fundamental characteristics of EU 
governance and hence, the role of citizenship within it. It is demonstrated on this basis that the 
construct of Union citizenship should be placed within the complex form of governance at the 
supranational level characterised by an advanced and well-structured economic system at its 
core and a more embryonic political system at its periphery.19 The chapter deploys the notion 
of economic constitution to highlight the level of autonomy reached by the EU economic 
system, as opposed to the political, and its contribution to enabling citizens’ participation in 
the supranational sphere.  
 
The argument put forward is that social solidarity does not constitute an overarching principle 
that steers the judicial interpretation of EU citizenship nor can it be used as a yardstick to 
evaluate the trajectory of the relevant case law. Under conditions of functional differentiation, 
the key element of Union citizenship is the integration of nationals of Member States to self-
organisational networks that characterise the constitutional landscape of the EU’s economic 
system. In this sense, citizenship becomes less fundamental in determining the relationship 
between the individual and the state20 and instead, designates the partial and multi-functional 
integration of actors in different roles in society. Therefore, it is argued that Union citizenship 
should be understood as ‘stakeholder constituency’ of the EU economic system and that, this 
way, it remains bound within its functional economic configuration. In light of this, it becomes 
clear that it is not possible to discern in the pre-Dano jurisprudence a linear normative 
expansion of the content of EU citizenship that reflects a common paradigm of social ordering 
and collective social identity in the Union nor to identify a subsequent retreat from such 
paradigm in the judicial interpretation of the Court. Instead, the CJEU judgments pertaining to 
economically inactive citizens can be explained from the perspective of the EU’s differentiated 
system of governance.  
 
To demonstrate this, the chapter is structured as follows. First, the concept of the EU economic 
constitution is introduced and placed within the broader academic debate on social solidarity 
in Europe. Its nature and function are examined in order to analyse how citizenship as 
‘stakeholder constituency’ fits within the constitutional structures of the Union. (Section 2). 
Second, the case law of the CJEU with respect to economically inactive persons and their 
access to social assistance in the host Member State is explored with a view to explaining its 
compatibility with the previous jurisprudence of the Court and citizenship law and to tracing 
how it relates to the system of EU governance (Section 3). The analysis presents some broader 
considerations on a soft version of solidarity as a corrective mechanism that enables the 
management of structural shortcomings in both Member States and the Union as a whole, and 
 
19  Achilles Skordas, ‘Is Europe an Aging Power with Global Vision - A Tale on Constitutionalism and 
Restoration,’ (2005) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 241, 288; Poul Kjaer, ‘The Transnational 
Constitution of Europe’s Social Market Economies: A Question of Constitutional Imbalances?’ (2019) 57 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 143, 155. 
20 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘The State in International Law’ CLPE Research Paper No 27/2010, Osgoode Hall Law 
School 3 available at 
<https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1094&context=clpe> accessed 3 April 
2020. See Neil Walker, ‘The Territorial Dimensions of Citizenship in Recent Academic Literature’ in Ayelet 
Shachar, Rainer Bauboeck, Irene Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship 
(Oxford University Press 2017) 554. 
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is concluded with some brief reflections on ‘corrective’ solidarity in the context of the initial 
EU measures in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (Section 4). 
 
2. The EU Economic Constitution and Citizenship 
 
Following the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the issue of solidarity has become pressing 
in relation to ascertaining the appropriate responses to the crisis and the longer-term prospects 
of reforming the Union in order to render it more resilient in the face of future economic 
challenges.21 An expansive view may be identified, which regards solidarity as entailing a deep 
interest of members of a political community in the integrity of social living conditions that are 
acceptable on the basis of distributive justice.22  Solidarity, in this sense, is rooted in the 
attitudes of mutual cooperation, concern and obligation that members in a political community 
have. It is associated with ‘the appeal to some image of decent, good or just society’23 that 
motivates people to support others in that community in times of need. For Habermas, this 
ideal of solidarity does not currently exist in the Union which risks becoming a ‘technocracy 
without democratic roots’.24 It can only be realised under conditions of deep transformation of 
the monetary union into a ‘real’ political union backed by social welfare through a process of 
political re-foundation of the EU.25 The decision to implement such change would signify that 
the ‘red line of the classical understanding of sovereignty would be crossed’ and ‘the idea that 
the nation states are “the sovereign subjects of the treaties” would have to be abandoned’26 in 
order to construct a politically constituted transnational democracy. This would contribute to 
the legitimation of EU integration by enhancing the European public sphere and providing the 
appropriate conditions for cosmopolitan discourse ethics. 
 
In this analysis, one of the core functions of solidarity is fair distribution of income, property, 
public services and public goods. It is assumed that solidarity cannot be fully realised when 
social inequalities between Member States persist and therefore, EU citizens and Member 
States should accept the redistribution of burden across national borders in order to achieve 
equal living standards across the Union. 27  It is the implementation of such a normative 
conception of solidarity that, according to this perspective, has the potential to strengthen the 
substance of EU citizenship and provide the impetus for political integration and democratic 
will-formation in Europe. Considerations of a protective Europe permeate policy proposals for 
developing uniform minimum social standards across the Union, setting a minimum wage and 
supporting a move towards convergence in social policy.28  
 
 
21 This debate has resurfaced with respect to the EU responses to the coronavirus pandemic. For an analysis see 
Section 4 below. 
22 Jürgen Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy (Polity Press 2015) 23. 
23 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ‘Introduction’ in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds), The Strains of 
Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (Oxford University Press 2017) 1, 6. In 
general, Maurizio Ferrera and Carlo Burelli, ‘Cross-National Solidarity and Political Sustainability in the EU 
After the Crisis (2019) 57 Journal of Common Market Studies 94; Esin Küçük, ‘Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive 
Political Statement or a Legal Principle with Substance?’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 965.  
24 Habermas (n 22) 11. 
25 Ibid., 9 and 14. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalisation of International 
Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 335, 348. 
28 E.g., President Emmanuel Macron, ‘Speech on New Initiative for Europe’ 26 September 2017 available at 
<https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/president-macron-gives-speech-on-new-initiative-for-
europe.en.> accessed 3 April 2020. 
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Taking account of an alternative construction of the Union’s governance however, its 
complexity is manifested in its systemic differentiation. The differentiation that exists in the 
social systems, such as the economy, politics, law, science and education, are linked to the 
semantics of constitutionalism to designate the levels of autonomy that these systems have 
achieved in the supranational context. As a structural coupling between the specialised and 
relatively autonomous functional setting of the economy and law, the economic constitution of 
the Union has both a constitutive and limitative function. In the first sense, it guarantees the 
autonomy of the economic system, which operates on the basis of market rationality and the 
generation of profit. In the second sense, it establishes limitations on the excessive power of 
economic actors that can be socially harmful and aims to preserve the compatibility of the 
economic system with the rest of society.29 As Kjaer notes: 
  
constitutions simultaneously constitute internal order within their respective functional areas and establish 
the possibility of stabilised linkages with other fields through the invoking of rights. They are simultaneously 
oriented towards the reduction of internal volatility and the safeguarding of autonomy vis-à-vis the outside 
world through targeted measures which aim to reduce asymmetries and crowding-out effects […].30 
 
The functional system of the economy includes the entire population of the Union’s territory, 
albeit to the extent that they act as economic agents. As follows, the constituency of the 
economy is not equated with the political constituencies of the Member States or their citizens. 
Its constituency rather encompasses individual economic actors, such as national and foreign 
investors, workers, traders and consumers, as well as enterprises and public or governmental 
bodies in their role in regulating and participating in the economy.31 More broadly, it includes 
any action and communication undertaken by natural or legal persons with the purpose of the 
gainful exchange of goods or services in the marketplace. The constituency of the economy 
thus relies on a ‘functional constituent power’, which emerges as a socially adequate order of 
communications and actions supported by economic rights and freedoms.32  
 
In a broad array of literature, the evolution of economic constitutionalism in Europe has come 
under strong criticism which points out the submission of social rights to the economic 
freedoms by the CJEU,33 the restriction of national labour policies by the integration of the 
 
29  Poul F Kjaer, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm (Routledge 2014) 125. See Gunther Teubner, ‘A 
Constitutional Moment? The Logics of “Hitting the Bottom”’ in Poul F Kjaer, Gunther Teubner and Alberto 
Febbrajo (eds), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 3. 
30 Poul F Kjaer, ‘Law and Order within and Beyond National Configurations’ in Kjaer, Teubner and Febbrajo 
ibid., 395, 412. For functional connections between politics and economy, see Poul F Kjaer (ed), The Law of 
Political Economy: Transformation in the Function of Law (Cambridge University Press 2020). 
31 James M Buchanan, ‘Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design’ in Vitantonio Muscatelli (ed), Economic 
and Political Institutions in Economic Policy (Manchester University Press 1996) 70, 82-4. 
32 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 62-63; Marc Amstutz, ‘In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal 
Reasoning’ (2005) 11 European Journal of International Law 766, 775. 
33 For example, Fritz W Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, Or Why the EU cannot be a “Social 
Market Economy”’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 211; Cathrine Barnard, ‘Social Dumping or Dumping 
Socialism? Case Note on Laval and Rüffert’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal 26; Christian Joerges and Florian 
Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1. 
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internal market34 and its neoliberal bias.35 For Giubboni, the constitutional structures that have 
emerged should be characterised ‘as a monumental exercise undertaken by “the economic” to 
rule “the political.”’ 36  The emergence of the Union’s economic constitution has indeed 
signified a de-coupling of the economic sphere from the welfare systems of Member States 
within which economic processes were embedded at the domestic level.37 However, while it 
has promoted the autonomy and expansion of the internal market, it would not be accurate to 
view the economic constitution only as a tool of deregulation at the supranational level, given 
that it is accompanied by mechanisms that enable it to operate and establish interactions with 
other social fields.38 In this sense, the EU economic constitution rests on the guarantee of 
economic freedoms and trade, the rules of financial stability and regulation of competition but 
is also supplemented by rules in a variety of policy areas, including fundamental rights, 
consumer protection and non-discrimination. They operate as supporting structures which 
contribute towards rendering the economic principles and processes of the economic system 
compatible with non-economic objectives. This can be clearly observed in relation to the 
economic freedoms of the internal market and their effects in social fields. For instance, the 
right to receive cross-border healthcare without undue delay has been developed under EU law 
through a web of judicial decisions on the free movement of services.39 Moreover, the principle 
of equal treatment has been applied to social assistance for specific categories of EU citizens 
within the framework of the free movement of workers and has required domestic authorities 
to reconsider whether and how they have taken into account the rights and interests of affected 
nationals of other Member States.40 Similarly, the insertion of fundamental rights into the law 
of the internal market has been a significant achievement of the Court that clearly show that 
the internal market is ‘porous’41 to non-economic principles. Cases, such as AGET Iraklis42 
and Commission v Hungary,43 illustrate that there is no fixed prioritisation between economic 
 
34 Phil Syrpis, ‘The EU and National Systems of Labour Law’ in Damian Chalmers and Anthony Arnull (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 944, 958; Claire Kilpatrick and 
Bruno de Witte (eds), ‘Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights 
Challenges’ EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/05 available at 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31247/LAW%20WP%202014%2005%20Social%20Rights%20fin
al%202242014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 3 April 2020. 
35  Stephen Gill, ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and 
Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (1998) 3 New Political Economy 5. 
36 Stefano Giubboni, ‘European Citizenship and Social Rights in Times of Crisis’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 
935, 957. See Fritz W Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy’ in London 
School of Economics ‘Europe in Questions’ Discussion Paper Series No 36/2011, 31; Francis Cheneval and 
Kaplypso Nicolaidis, ‘The Social Constriction of Demoicracy in the European Union’ (2016) 16 European 
Journal of Political Theory 235. 
37 Kjaer, Constitutionalism (n 29) 125. 
38 Ibid. 
39  Judgment of 12 July 2001, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-157/99, ECR 2001 I-05473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404; Judgment of 
13 May 2003, V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. 
van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-385/99, ECR I-04509, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:270; Judgment of 16 May 2006, The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford 
Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health, Case C-372/04, ECR I – 4376, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325. 
40 Grainne de Burca and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘The Denationalisation of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47 Harvard 
Journal of International Law 243, 260-1; Raphaële Xenidis, ‘Transforming EU Equality Law? On Disruptive 
Narrative and False Dichotomies’ (2019) Yearbook of European Law 1. 
41 Stephen Weatherhill, The Internal Market as a Legal Concept (Oxford University Press 2017) 139. 
42  Judgment of 21 December 2016, Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos 
Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis, Case C-201/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:972. 
43 Judgment of 18 June 2020, European Commission v Hungary, Case C-78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476. For earlier 
cases, Judgment of 12 June 2003, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik 
Österreich, Case C-112/00, ECR I-05659, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333; Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega 
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freedoms and fundamental rights and that symmetric interaction between them is possible.44  
 
On the contrary, the political system of the Union is less advanced and is internally 
differentiated into individual segments corresponding to the Member States. The heterarchy of 
political authorities within the Member States and EU institutions sheds light on the 
interactions between them in terms of horizontal cooperation and mutual accommodation. 
Therefore, the Union’s political system remains entangled with the governments of the 
Member States even though its ‘pluralistic complexity and functional differentiation of 
horizontally linked social subsystems means a departure from the nation state and its 
sovereignty as a unified system of representative authority in full territorial and political 
control’.45 This creates a sense of complementarity in the political structures and legitimacy of 
the Union which is documented by its multilevel structures. In the absence of a fully formed, 
single European demos, notions of democratic legitimacy are still largely revolving around the 
domestic demoi – e.g., as the involvement of national parliaments in the Union’s governance 
and opt-out policies demonstrate46 – and EU citizens represent the constituent power at the EU 
level but only acting as peoples within their Member States. 47  Overall therefore, EU 
governance simultaneously operates within a multiplicity of functionally differentiated 
settings. It is supported by an economic system that is capable of developing constitutional 
principles for its internal stabilisation and compatibility with non-economic values and a 
political system characterised by differentiation, which ‘rules out the possibility of a new 
political centre’ beyond those of the Member States.48  
 
The above observations show that constituting normative and institutional political hierarchies 
is not an attainable task within the decentralised character of the EU. As Ladeur has 
convincingly  noted, the increasing heterogeneity among Member States makes it impossible 
to establish collective conceptions of common good and stable patterns of action for the 
development of social policies at the supranational level.49 This puts into question the viability 
of a centralised economic and political constitutional framework beyond the nation-state and 
brings into the fore the necessity for a flexible and acentric system of governance in Europe. 
From this point of view, heterogeneity in the constitutional landscape of the Union’s economy 
needs to be preserved. Rather than replacing the organically grown varieties in the economic 
institutions and welfare systems of the Member States,50 networked-type economic governance 
 
Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, ECR 
I-09609, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 
44 See Charles F Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511; Oliver Gerstenberg, 
‘Fundamental Rights and Democratic Sovereignty in the EU: The Role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (CFREU) in Regulating the European Social Market Economy’ (2020) Yearbook of European Law 1; 
Kaarlo Tuori, ‘The Many Constitutions of Europe’ in Oxford Handbooks Online (2016) available at 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199935352-e-23?print=pdf> accessed 3 April 2020. 
45 Jiří Přibáň, ‘The Self-Referential European Polity, its Legal Context and Systemic Differentiation: Theoretical 
Reflections on the Emergence of the EU’s Political and Legal Autopoiesis’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 445, 
459; idem, ‘Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe’s Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference’ (2010) Ratio 
Juris 41. 
46 Ibid., 458. 
47 See Achilles Skordas, ‘Self-determination of Peoples and Transnational Regimes: A Foundational Principle of 
Global Governance’ in Nicholas Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 
2007) 207, 247. 
48 Přibáň (n 45) 459. 
49 Ladeur (n 9) 158. 
50 Gosta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Polity Press 1990); Eyal Benvenisti and Georg 
Nolte (eds), The Welfare State, Globalisation and International Law (Springer 2004). 
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in the Union can maintain diversity and experimentation in the adjustment of Member States.  
 
Against this background, the question is raised as to how EU citizenship should be 
conceptualized in structuring the relationships that emerge between EU citizens and Member 
States other than that of their nationality. It also presents a mechanism for reflection on the 
diverse standards of social protection in the Member States and on the legal tools for 
overcoming undesirable obstructions to the integration of EU citizens in host States. The 
discussion below presents EU citizenship as ‘stakeholder constituency’ to address these issues. 
 
2.1  EU Citizenship as ‘Stakeholder Constituency’ 
 
Citizenship may be viewed either from the lens of common identity and sentiments of social 
solidarity or as a functional construct that enables the participation of individual actors in 
societal spheres of action. In Kymlicka’s terms, the former approach refers to membership in 
a political community with ethnic and cultural ties. 51  This does not necessarily require 
homogeneous and deep-rooted ethno-cultural bonds nor does it preclude diverse cultural and 
religious practices. On the contrary, it is an inclusive model of citizenship that accommodates 
ethnic diversity and develops within a multicultural model of statehood and community 
membership. Citizenship in this context is characterised by nation state frames; it consolidates 
and diffuses the territorial state rather than transcending it. While citizenship presupposes a 
shared identity and community, its constitutional function is that it structures the relationship 
between the nation state and citizens. In doing so, it generates ‘solidarity between strangers’52 
that makes them responsible for each other and develops a force of social integration that is 
most clearly manifested in the operation of the welfare state.53 It thus promotes the expansion 
of social rights with a primary focus on the redistribution of resources of the welfare state and, 
as Habermas put it, forms a ‘mechanism by which the legal and material infrastructure of 
actually preferred forms of life is secured’.54  
 
From this perspective, the construct of EU citizenship would rest on a collective social identity 
at the supranational level and collective conceptions of common good. Solidarity would 
constitute the basis of social policy and an overarching principle which could raise the 
expectation that conflicting social visions would be resolved in favour of upholding an 
obligation to support EU citizens in need. When it comes to the analysis of the CJEU case law 
on economically inactive EU citizens, social solidarity would mandate an expansive 
interpretation of their rights to enable them to access social assistance on an equal footing with 
the citizens of the host States and hence, provide a step towards the conceptualisation of a 
European welfare state. On the basis of these assumptions, when the Court in its Dano decision 
recognises the right of Member States to refuse social assistance to economically inactive 
citizens (discussed in Section 3 below), it is viewed with scepticism as retreating from a 




51 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’ 
(1994) 104 Ethics 352; idem, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice’ in Seyla Benhabib and Robert Post 
(eds), Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford University Press 2006) 128. In general, see Richard Bellamy, ‘Modern 
Citizenship’ in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione, Emilio Santoro (eds), Lineages of European Citizenship, 
Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation-States (Palgrave 2004). 
52 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future 
of Sovereignty and Citizenship’ (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 125, 132. 
53 Ibid., 132-135. 
54 Ibid., 132. 
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In the systemically differentiated model of EU governance however, a normative principle such 
as social solidarity cannot be viewed as having a stabilising function in determining the rights 
of EU citizens. The latter approach to citizenship therefore offers an explanatory framework 
that enables a recalibration of Union citizenship in functional terms. Instead of relying on the 
‘normatively-demanding’55 process of collective identity formation, Thornhill has observed 
that the edifice of citizenship rests upon the fragmentation of post-modern society into 
functional sectors and has criticised its conflation with nationality and ethno-cultural 
allegiance:  
 
In different societies, […] we can now identify certain domain-specific modes of citizenship practice, in 
which individual social agents act as the citizens of separated functional spheres - for example, the 
environment, medicine, education - and they create hard norms for these domains by linking inner-societal 
demands to rights constructed in the global legal system.56  
 
In light of this, Union citizenship becomes disentangled from the territorial limitation of 
statehood and its link to nationality and can be understood in terms of ‘stakeholder 
constituency’. 57  ‘Stakeholder constituency’ designates the partial and multi-functional 
integration of actors in differing societal roles who have a stake in participating in functionally 
limited domains of action and have a right to be taken into account in decision-making 
processes. For example, within the functional system of the economy, citizenship represents 
the status of individuals as workers, consumers, investors, traders, service providers and 
shareholders. Framing citizenship in this way exposes its partial and fragmented elements 
within social systems and highlights two important dimensions of it.  
 
First, it does not designate an institution of membership in a European demos whereby criteria 
of membership and substantive rights and duties are determined by central political decisions. 
It is evolving through multiple networks and functionally differentiated rationalities and 
therefore, adapts to the multidimensional and multitemporal processes of constitutionalisation 
in Europe. Even though Tuori does not adopt a systems theoretical approach, he identifies the 
potential of these processes to enrich the position of individuals vis-à-vis the European polity 
by adding supplementary layers of citizenship – what he calls market, political, juridical and 
social forms of citizenship – and by thus increasing the possibilities of action.58 EU citizenship 
enables participation in the spontaneous spheres of social systems and facilitates the 
enforcement of the associated rights and obligations regardless of the social attributes and 
national identity of the individual. As alluded to above, these rights can operate as 
constitutionally supported irritants within social systems, in general, and the economy, in 
particular, and orient them towards environmental compatibility.  
 
Second, by increasing inclusion in societal activities or communications, Union citizenship 
renders the EU’s fragmented governance more open towards the interests of its addressees. In 
a different context, Teubner has reframed the principle of political representation in nation 
 
55 Kjaer, Constitutionalism (n 29) 91. 
56 Chris Thornhill, ‘The Citizen of Many Worlds: Societal Constitutionalism and the Antinomies of Democracy’ 
(2018) 45 Journal of Law and Society 73, 91. See also Joseph H H Weiler and Joel P Trachtman, ‘European 
Constitutionalism and its Discontents’ (1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 354, 
375; Opinion of Advocate-General Miguel P Maduro in Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern (30 September 2009) 
Case C-135/08, para. 23. 
57 Kjaer, Constitutionalism (n 29) 89. See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Constitutionalism and the State of the “Society of 
Networks”: The Design of a New ‘Control Project’ for a Fragmented Legal System’ (2015) 2 Transnational Legal 
Theory 463; idem, ‘A Critique of Balancing and the Principle of Proportionality in Constitutional Law – a Case 
for ‘Impersonal Rights’?’ (2016) 7 Transnational Legal Theory 228. 
58 Tuori (n 8) 110-111 and 336. 
	 11	
states and replaced it by the principle of self-contention of transnational regimes by their 
constituencies, as a way of dealing with the absence of a unified collective identity.59 Through 
their intertwined interactions, these constituencies articulate the interests of stakeholders 
(internal and external to the regime) and mobilise internal self-contestation. This sheds light 
on the overlapping constituencies that emerge within the highly diverse and specialised 
functional spheres in the EU, and that reshape the links between stakeholders, the supranational 
institutions and the Member States. EU citizenship as systemic participation, therefore, may be 
considered as a source of inducing legitimacy to EU governance through procedures that do 
not presuppose consensus-building but provide opportunities for dissent and generation of 
knowledge.60 
 
Viewed in these terms, an economic form of citizenship has been deployed by the EU Treaties 
and the CJEU to designate how EU law conveys the capacity of individuals to participate in 
the internal market through the guarantee of economic freedoms and judicial remedies. It 
creates a field of action which is based on the organising principles of the internal market 
concerning free movement and thus, represents the constituency of the economic system. At 
the same time, through its strong focus on non-discrimination, the Court has established the 
compatibility of Union citizenship also with non-economic objectives relating to access to 
social assistance for economically active persons and those lawfully residing in the Member 
State, even if they are economically inactive. In this way, the Court has been a driving force 
entrenching the relevant rights under a conceptualisation of EU citizenship that is disentangled 
from strong normative expectations.61 
 
Having discussed the constitutional structures of the Union and the construct of citizenship, 
the section below explores the recent case law of the CJEU on economically inactive persons. 
It illustrates that the judgments retain the functional economic configuration of Union 
citizenship and delimit its parameters without reversing earlier, well-established jurisprudence.  
 
3. The Boundaries of Economic Citizenship: The Case of Economic Inactivity 
 
In a number of judgments - Dano, Alimanovic, Garcia Nieto and Commission v UK - the key 
issue was whether the principle of equal treatment between national citizens and citizens from 
other Member States applied in the case of economically inactive persons residing in a host 
Member State so as to entitle them to social assistance – in the form of special non-contributory 
benefits in the first three cases and social security benefits in the last one. The conflict between 
the ‘economic’ dimensions of EU citizenship and its ‘social’ aspects, as manifested in the 
application of the principle of equal treatment on economically active and inactive persons, has 
been a central aspect of these decisions.  
 
The construction of EU citizenship by the CJEU has been criticised for its apparent insufficient 
scrutiny of Member State policies on refusing social assistance to economically inactive EU 
 
59 Gunther Teubner, ‘Quod Omnes Tangit: Transnational Constitutions Without Democracy?’ (2018) 45 Journal 
of Law and Society 5; Jiří Přibáň, ‘Constitutional Imaginaries and Legitimation: On Potentia, Potestas, and 
Auctoritas in Societal Constitutionalism’ (2018) 45 Journal of Law and Society 30. 
60 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Globalisation and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy 
Survive the End of the Nation State?’ EUI Working Paper LAW 2003/4 available at 
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/199> accessed 24 April 2020. In relation to participation and ‘access justice’ 
in European private law, Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law’ EUI Working 
Papers 2011/02 available at <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15706> accessed 24 April 2020. 
61 For the role of courts and rights discourse in the evolution of transnational constitutionalism, Chris Thornhill, 
A Sociology of Transnational Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
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citizens and for not following a rigorous application of the proportionality test. In turn, this has 
meant that the Court has failed to effectively reinforce social solidarity at the Union level.62 
The criticism is primarily based on the assumption that the initial case law appeared to be 
surrounded by a tissue of normativity that offered support to the emergence of social solidarity 
among EU citizens and Member States. 63  To this extent, critical accounts of the CJEU 
emphasise that the earlier case law had ‘the merit of universalising the logic of social 
integration’ and that access to the social protection systems of Member States would become 
‘an autonomous constitutive element of Union citizenship’ that would transcend the 
‘mercantile ratio and the original idea of homo oeconomicus.’64 Evidence to support this view 
is based on previous judgments, such as that of Martínez Sala,65 Grzelczyk66 and Brey.67 In 
these three cases, in particular, the Court accepted that access to social assistance should not 
be automatically rejected by domestic authorities in situations where the claimant was not 
categorised as economically active. By recourse to the principles of equal treatment and 
proportionality, the Court established that students (Grzelczyk), pensioners (Brey) and persons 
who lawfully reside in the host Member - even if not economically active (Martínez Sala) - 
may have an entitlement to social assistance. Following from this, the post-Dano decisions 
have been presented as diverging from previous judgments. 
 
A close reading of the trajectory of the case law demonstrates, nevertheless, that the substantive 
content of citizenship law does not create an expectation of social solidarity nor does it 
designate that the Court had previously followed a linear expansion of EU citizenship as a 
source of social solidarity in the Union. Earlier case law constituted a necessary development 
stage in which the Court incrementally introduced the pillars and different categories of EU 
citizens, such as students and jobseekers, based on the factual circumstances of the cases and 
the parallel orientation of secondary EU law in the field. With the post-Dano case law, EU 
citizenship enters a consolidation phase so that its limits are clarified within the growing level 
of unstructured complexity of EU governance and national welfare states. Even though not 
explicitly, the Court rejects a construction of EU citizenship within a form of political 
constitutionalism associated with the nation-state and upholds the flexibility of the functional 
and fragmented notion of EU citizenship with regard to the categorisation of the status of 
citizens and the varieties in domestic welfare systems.68  
 
Drawing on the analysis in Section 2 above, the concept of EU citizenship is not developed by 
the Court via a stable frame of reference to represent the role of EU citizens in a fully formed 
 
62 Giubboni (n 36). See Vassilis Hatzopoulos, ‘From Economic Crisis to Identity Crisis: The Spoliation of EU and 
National Citizenships’ College of Europe’, European Legal Studies Research Papers in Law 1/2017 available at 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/86618/1/researchpaper_1_2017_vassilis_hatzopoulos.pdf> accessed 4 April 2020. 
63 See Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’ (2005) 68 
The Modern Law Review 233; Pauline Phoa, ‘EU Citizens’ Access to Social Benefits: Reality or Fiction? 
Outlining a Law and Literature Approach to Citizenship’ in Frans Pennings and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (eds), EU 
Citizenship and Social Rights: Entitlements and Impediments to Accessing Welfare (Edward Elgar 2018) 199, 
219-223. 
64 Stefano Giubboni, ‘Free Movement of Persons and European Solidarity Revisited’ (2015) 7 Perspectives on 
Federalism 1. 
65  Judgment of 12 May 1998, María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, Case C-85/96, ECR I-2691, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:217 (hereinafter ‘Martínez Sala’). 
66 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre Public d'aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Case C-184/99 ECR I-06193, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458 (hereinafter ‘Grzelczyk’). 
67  Judgment of 19 September 2013, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, Case C-140/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:565 (hereinafter ‘Brey’). 
68 In general, Thornhill (n 56); Gert Verschraegen, ‘Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis 
from the Perspective of Systems Theory’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 258. 
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constitutional polity nor can it provide the ground for a comprehensive judicial viewpoint on 
the permanent prioritisation of the conflicting rationalities of the economic and social aspects 
of citizenship. Two arguments are put forward in this section. First, the decisions of the Court 
do not constitute a marked shift from its previous case law nor a ‘long jump’69 in its rationale. 
The Court, instead, demonstrates continuity in its reasoning by clarifying and demarcating the 
parameters of the equal treatment principle with respect to the position of economically 
inactive persons. Second, the Court gives up the impossible pathway of creating a common 
discourse of social solidarity and attempts to manage the conflict via the normatively thin 
principles of legal certainty and transparency. Its reasoning is underpinned by the notion of 
certainty in the relationships between the EU citizens, the EU institutions and Member States 
that emerge in these cases and by the avoidance of the prospect of direct redistributive policies 
at the EU across the social security systems of Member States.  
 
3.1  Delimiting the Parameters of Economic Citizenship 
 
In its 2014 decision in Dano, the Court clarified that, according to Article 7 of Directive 
2004/38, Member States have the right to refuse social assistance to economically inactive 
persons exercising their right to free movement solely for the purpose of obtaining that 
assistance.70 It then continued by stating that the financial situation of each person must be 
examined specifically, without taking into account the social benefits claimed. Despite the fact 
that the Court did not refer to the principle of proportionality, this formulation clearly 
corresponds to a balancing test pertaining to the application of proportionality in order to 
determine whether the EU national meets the requirement of sufficient resources and hence, 
qualifies for a right of residence under Article 7(1)(b) CRD.71 
 
In line with previous case law, the CJEU stressed that, pursuant to Recital 10, the purpose of 
the Directive is to prevent EU nationals from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance systems of Member States. Article 7, including the subparagraphs that relate to 
economically inactive persons and jobseekers, concretises this objective. Economically 
inactive persons are required to have sufficient resources and comprehensive health insurance 
in order to reside lawfully in a Member State and thus, the interpretation of what constitutes 
sufficient resources depends on an assessment by the host State on a case-by-case basis.72 With 
respect to jobseekers, in particular, the wording of the Directive is not open-ended and does 
not leave room for discretion to domestic authorities or to the Court. Under Article 7(3), 
jobseekers who have previously worked in the Member State for less than one year retain their 
status of worker for no less than six months and therefore, can rely on the principle of equal 
treatment and access social assistance in that period.73 However, if they have been employed 
for more than a year before being involuntarily unemployed and are registered as jobseekers, 
the Directive does not specify a time limitation to the retention of the status of worker. 
 
The core issue in Alimanovic was whether EU citizens classified as first-time jobseekers could 
be excluded from entitlement to certain non-contributory benefits. The claimants, who were 
 
69 Koen Lanaerts, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s ‘Stone-by-Stone’ Approach’ (2015) 1 
International Comparative Jurisprudence 1,1. 
70 Dano (n 10) para. 78. 
71 Ibid., para. 80. 
72 Article 7(1)(b) CRD. 
73  Judgment of 4 June 2009, Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) 
Nürnberg 900, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, ECR I-04585, ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, para. 32 (hereinafter 
‘Vatsouras’) and Alimanovic (n 15) para. 54. 
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Swedish nationals, were employed for 11 months in Germany and, after their employment had 
ended, they received social assistance for six months on the basis of their status as workers. By 
relying on the derogation of Article 24(2), the national authorities terminated the claimants’ 
access to social benefits after the completion of the six-month period, given that they no longer 
retained the status as workers but were instead classified as first-time jobseekers. The Court 
confirmed that access could be refused under these circumstances and further ruled that the 
application of proportionality was not necessary with respect to the issue in the main 
proceedings. The reason was, according to the Court, that the relevant provisions of the 
Directive provide a gradual system of protection taking into account the individual situation of 
the claimant and the duration of the economic activity. As the Directive itself integrates the 
evaluation of proportionality under Article 7(3), the Court seeks to uphold the legal certainty 
and transparency achieved by enabling states and citizens to know, without ambiguity, their 
rights and obligations in the context of social assistance.74  
 
At a methodological level, the refusal of the Court to apply the proportionality test beyond the 
wording of the Directive in this case has been strongly criticised. It has been perceived as a 
deviation from the earlier decision in Brey, discussed in this section below, where the Court 
had laid down detailed criteria that must be considered with regard to the proportionality test.75 
Especially if the facts of Alimanovic are closely considered, recourse to proportionality has 
been advocated as appropriate and even morally imperative: if the claimants had worked for 
one more month and had completed one year of employment in Germany, they would have 
been entitled to retain the status as workers and access to social assistance for as long as they 
were registered as jobseekers with the relevant employment office pursuant to the CRD.76 
Nevertheless, there are three factors as to why the rights and obligations deriving from EU 
citizenship restricted the Court’s interpretation to the outcome of the Alimanovic decision. 
 
First, the Court recognised that legal certainty and deference to the legislature would contribute 
to more effective protection of rights and hence, to the rule of law. By relying on the purpose 
of the Directive, the CJEU emphasised that it provides a single legislative act and a gradual 
system of remedies to EU citizens, determined on the basis of a sector-by-sector approach. It 
should be noted that legal certainty and transparency of the applicable criteria operate in a 
distinct ‘Janus-faced’ manner with respect to the provisions of the Directive. The host Member 
State is in a position to refuse social assistance after six-months of unemployment to jobseekers 
who have worked for less than a year (Art 7(3)(c)), but may not do so for those who have 
completed one year of employment (Art 7(3)(b)). The effect of the provision in the latter case 
is that the persons enjoy retention of the status of workers and domestic authorities have no 
discretion to evaluate whether they become an unreasonable burden on public finances. 
Introducing a more flexible interpretation of Art 7(3)(c) by resorting to proportionality could, 
however, risk unsettling the certainty and long-term social protection under the principle of 
equal treatment to persons falling within the scope of Art 7(3)(b). It could induce states to also 
review whether the latter category of persons may become an unreasonable burden and lead to 
restrictions on free movement. It becomes apparent, therefore, that financial obligations of 
 
74 Alimanovic (n 15) para. 61. For an explanation that the Directive provides codification of the previous case law 
of the Court and, in particular, incorporates the principle of proportionality in its provisions, see Ferdinand 
Wollenschläger, ‘The Judiciary, the Legislature and the Evolution of Union Citizenship’ in Phil Syrpis (ed), The 
Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012) 302, 330.  
75 See Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot, ‘Deconstructing the Former Edifice of Union Citizenship? The Alimanovic 
Judgment’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1007. 
76 Article 7(3)(b) and (c) CRD. See Michael Blauberger and Susanne K Schmidt, ‘Free Movement, the Welfare 
State, and the European Union’s Over-Constitutionalisation: Administrating Contradictions’ (2017) 95 Public 
Administration 437. 
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Member States towards EU citizens are not dismissed by the Court, but delineated within the 
framework of the Directive. In this way, the Court succeeds in structuring the principle of 
proportionality in a polycentric context of conflicting interests – the promotion of transnational 
mobility of EU citizens and the maintenance of financial stability of domestic welfare systems 
– and to defer to the EU legislature and to the Member States when the wording of the Directive 
is not ambiguous and does not leave room for interpretative discretion.77  
 
In light of the above, the decision in Garcia Nieto confirms this approach by adding that the 
assessment of individual circumstances is not necessary in the case of economically inactive 
persons residing in the host Member State for less than three months. Introducing an obligation 
for host Member States to be responsible for the provision of social assistance of persons within 
the first three months could, according to the Court, potentially upset the financial equilibrium 
of the national welfare system.78 More importantly though, an entitlement to social assistance 
for persons in the first three months of residence would emerge at a lower threshold than for 
persons residing for more than three months: the latter would still be required under the 
Directive to demonstrate sufficient resources and have medical cover, but the former would 
not be bound by such a requirement. If this approach were to be endorsed, it could push towards 
introducing conditions under domestic law in cases of residents claiming social benefits in the 
first three months and thereby, risking the predictability and consistency of the relationship 
between economically inactive citizens and Member States. Read in conjunction with the 
subsequent decision in Commission v UK, the Court’s interpretation of the Directive provides 
some insight into how Member States can preserve their capacity to manage a degree of 
inequality with respect to the treatment of economically active and inactive persons in the area 
of social benefits that is integral under EU law.79 In Commission v UK it was determined that 
the UK’s requirement – i.e., that claimants of social security benefits must have the right to 
reside –  would in principle constitute indirect discrimination. Such measure was considered 
justified however given that it pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of public finances 
in accordance with proportionality on the basis that verification of residence was not carried 
out systematically, but only if the domestic authorities had reasonable doubt. Therefore, the 
national requirement complied with Article 14(2) of the Directive.80  
 
Second, the Court’s reasoning in Dano and Alimanovic should be carefully distinguished from 
the earlier decision in Brey. Lanceiro has noted that Dano and Alimanovic present a 
methodological departure from Brey that is manifested in the way the Court approached the 
principle of proportionality and positioned EU citizenship in the constitutional framework of 
EU law.81 A more nuanced reading of the judgments, however, illustrates that the divergence 
from Brey was pertinent in light of the facts of the subsequent cases and does not provide 
conclusive evidence of a shift in the methodology of the CJEU per se. 
 
 
77 The Court’s rationale on legal certainty and transparency has been followed by the Commission in its proposals 
to clarify the rules on economically inactive persons. See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council’ COM(2016) 815 final 2-3 and 6-9. 
78 Garcia-Nieto (n 16) para. 45. 
79 Dano (n 10) para. 77. 
80 Commission v UK (n 17) para 83-85. For a critical perspective, see Herwig Verschueren, ‘Recent Case Before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2017) 19 European Journal of Social Security 71; Niamh Nic 
Shuibhne, ‘What I Tell You Three Times is True’: Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’ (2016) 23 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 908; Charlotte O’Brien, ‘The ECJ Sacrifices EU 
Citizenship in Vain: Commission v United Kingdom’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 209. 
81 Rui Lanceiro, ‘Dano and Alimanovic: The Recent Evolution of CJEU Case-Law on EU Citizenship and Cross-
Border Access to Social Benefits’ (2017) 3 UNIO - EU Law Journal 63, 68-9. 
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The claimant in Brey was a German national residing in Austria who received his invalidity 
pension and care allowance from Germany. He requested a non-contributory benefit from the 
Austrian authorities in order to augment his pension which was not sufficient to ensure the 
minimum means of subsistence. The contribution of the judgment is that it clarified whether a 
claim to benefits would prove lack of sufficient resources. If a person is eligible for benefits in 
light of low pension, then, as stated by the Court, he or she might not have sufficient resources 
so as not to become a burden on public financial resources. Nevertheless, an overall assessment 
of the specific burden by reference to personal circumstances of the individual’s situation must 
be conducted by the domestic authorities.82 The Court provided a detailed account of the 
factors that need to be considered for the purposes of the proportionality test, such as whether 
the difficulties are temporary, the length of residence and the amount of assistance granted. 
Automatically barring access to social benefits, without an overall assessment of individual 
circumstances determining a person’s right to reside, would be contrary not only to the 
principle of proportionality, but also to Articles 7(1)(b) and 8(4) CRD.83  
 
The key here, of course, is that in contrast to the factual circumstances in Dano the claimant in 
Brey had some resources, as he received about 1,000 euros a month from the German state, and 
the host Member State had to determine whether these were sufficient. Rather than making 
itself an evaluation, the CJEU deferred to the referring domestic court to decide how the 
individual assessment should be applied to the facts. The Court’s reasoning may as well be 
applied in a way that would not permit access to social assistance for the claimant. The 
interpretation of proportionality in the judgment was very carefully couched with the statement 
that the financial difficulties of the claimants must be temporary so that they do not become an 
unreasonable burden. 84  The emphasis on temporary hardship as a central factor in the 
application of proportionality is closely in line with the seminal decision in the Grzelczyk 
case.85 Unlike Grzelczyk, which concerned a student who was working for three years before 
he applied for temporary assistance, the applicant in Brey was a pensioner with no intension to 
resume work. It cannot be precluded therefore that his hardship seemed rather long-term in the 
absence of an attempt to seek employment and that this factor could have proven detrimental 
for him. Davies explains that the facts of the case in Brey are what make this judgment 
exceptional, in that, the claimant made his application to social assistance from the moment he 
arrived in the host State, not after some period of residence and employment before falling into 
hardship.86 He convincingly argues thus that it was the judgment in Brey which appears to be 
a deviation from earlier cases such as Grzelczyk, rather than the decisions in Dano and 
Alimanovic. 
 
On this basis, the arguable departure of Dano also from the judgment in Martínez Sala is not 
substantiated as the two cases are distinguishable and hence not comparable. In line with 
Martínez Sala, the Court in Dano confirmed that the principle of equal treatment with respect 
to access to social benefits applies only if the claimants lawfully reside in the Member State 
and that it must defer, where possible, to the national courts to determine the status of claimants 
 
82 Brey (n 67) paras. 69-72. 
83 Ibid., para. 77. 
84 Ibid., paras. 57 and 72. 
85 Grzelczyk (n 66). 
86 Gareth Davies, ‘Migrant Union Citizens and Social Assistance: Trying to be Reasonable about Self-Sufficiency’ 
European Legal Studies Research Papers in Law 2/16, 12-13 available at 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/85829/1/researchpaper_2_2016_davies.pdf> accessed 4 April 2020. More recently idem, ‘Has 
the Court Changed, or Have the Cases? The Deservingness of Litigants as an Element in Court of Justice 
Citizenship Adjudication’ (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy 1442. 
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as workers or other categories recognised under EU law.87 What constitutes a deviation from 
Martínez Sala is the fact that the CJEU has now clarified that lawful residence must be in 
compliance with the conditions of the Directive, not national law. The claimant in Martínez 
Sala resided legally in Germany as a result of the German authorities issuing her a residence 
permit in accordance with national law that brought the claimant within the scope of EU law. 
In subsequent cases, however, the Court has repeatedly emphasised that the conditions of 
lawful residence must be determined on the basis of the Directive in order to ensure the 
interpretation of free movement rights in a uniform and predictable manner across Member 
States.88 The comparison with Martínez Sala therefore, a pre-CRD judgment concerning a 
claimant who lived in Germany since 1968 and had worked at various intervals for ten years, 
seems that could not have worked in favour of the claimants in Dano and Alimanovic. 
 
An additional point of distinction in the reasoning of the Court in Brey is the link drawn 
between access to social assistance and expulsion. Whereas in Dano and Alimanovic the CJEU 
focused exclusively on whether economically inactive persons could access social assistance 
in the host state, in Brey it also relied on Articles 8(4) and 14(3) to determine whether the 
expulsion of the claimant should be automatic on the basis that he claimed social assistance in 
Austria. Clearly emphasising that automatic expulsion on these grounds would be contrary to 
the Directive, the Court explained that consideration of individual resources - and thus a 
proportionality test - are required by Article 8(4).89 The Court recognised that the right of 
residence of the claimant was not directly at issue in the proceedings, but went on to 
reformulate the question of the referring national court so as to render it a relevant factor in the 
context of specific legislative provisions under Austrian law. Therefore, the focus was placed 
on whether recourse to social assistance could determine that the claimant did not have 
sufficient resources and, as a consequence, could be expelled.90 The reformulation of the issues 
of access to economically inactive persons to social assistance and expulsion seems to have led 
the Court to a widening of the proportionality principle by comparison to preceding and 
subsequent case law. 
 
Third, even before the Dano and Alimanovic judgments, the Court had equated integration of 
EU citizens in host Member States with economic participation and not with social solidarity. 
For example, the assistance guaranteed to first-time jobseekers by EU law clearly demonstrates 
this point. EU citizens falling within this category are entitled to benefits of a financial nature 
that facilitate their access to employment, but Member States have the possibility of refusing 
social assistance. In addition, the domestic authorities may require the establishment of a ‘real 
link’ of jobseekers with the labour market before providing access to such financial benefits. 
The link can be demonstrated by genuinely looking for a job for a reasonable period,91 but not 
via personal or family ties.92 Integration through work, not through welfare support, has been 
 
87 Martínez Sala (n 65) para 45. See also Vatsouras (n 73) para. 31. 
88 Judgment of 21 December 2011, Tomasz Ziolkowski and Others, Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, ECR I-
14035, ECLI:EU:C:2011:866, paras. 32-33 (hereinafter ‘Ziolkowski’). See Recital 17 and Article 24 CRD. 
89 Brey (n 67) paras. 29 and 67. The Court confirmed this in Alimanovic (n 15) para. 59. 
90 Ibid., paras. 30 and 32. 
91 Judgment of 23 March 2004, Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-138/02, 
ECR I-02703, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, para. 37 (hereinafter ‘Collins’); Vatsouras (n 73) paras. 36-8. For students, 
who need to demonstrate a ‘certain degree of integration’, see Judgment of 15 March 2005, The Queen (on the 
application of Dany Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Case C-
209/03, ECR I-02119, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para. 57 (hereinfter ‘Bidar’). 
92 See decision in Garcia-Nieto (n 16). The statement of the Court was made in relation to those residing within 
the first three months in the Member State. The situation should be distinguished from students given that it is not 
comparable with that of workers or jobseekers. Students may be required to have a ‘certain degree of integration 
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the basis of the Court’s construction of EU citizenship and thus, functional integration carries 
the weight rather than ‘thick’ membership bonds to a European social order. Even though not 
explicitly stated, the CJEU’s approach appears to be in the same line as that of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in the Treaty of Lisbon judgment in which the latter explained 
that welfare policy lies within the responsibility and decision-making of the state, given the 
lack of a European demos, and of the relevant competencies of EU institutions.93 
 
A final point that should be addressed with respect to the reasoning of the CJEU in Alimanovic 
is whether the fact that the Court omitted to make reference to EU citizenship as the 
fundamental status of citizens and to Article 20 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) is problematic. While the use of language and the choice of the Court not to 
refer to Article 20 could, in principle, signal a normative transformation in its approach, in this 
instance it would not be possible to reach such a conclusion. The reason for this is twofold. 
First, the CJEU has not refrained from reiterating that EU citizenship is destined to become the 
fundamental status of citizens of the Union after the Alimanovic judgment in cases concerning 
economically inactive citizens such as students.94 Second, the absence of a reference to Article 
20 does not appear to be detrimental to the claimants, as it is highly doubtful that it could have 
changed the outcome of the case. Since Article 20 explicitly recognises that the rights derived 
from EU citizenship must be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits 
incorporated under secondary EU law, the Court expounds and consolidates the application of 
these conditions on the different treatment of the categories of persons under the framework of 
EU citizenship.95 That way, secondary EU law does not supersede nor is ‘hegemonically’96 
attributed supremacy over primary EU law, but gives concrete expression to the right to move, 
to reside and to be treated equally on a sector-by-sector basis. As jobseekers are treated as 
economically active for the purposes of granting them assistance on the basis of the length of 
their previous employment in the host State and have the potential of economically integrating 
and contributing to the public finances, the nature of the link with the host State differs from 
that of economically inactive persons.97 Once the claimants seized to be categorised as such, 
the limits of the CRD applied to their situation.  
 
3.2  A Response to Calls for Social Solidarity 
 
In addition to the reservations in academic literature regarding the methodology of the Court 
discussed in the section above, scepticism has been expressed with respect to the wider 
normative implications that the judgments could have on the notion of social identity in Europe. 
In this light, Iliopoulou-Penot has criticised the Court for backtracking ‘from its previous vision 
of citizenship, construed as a “status of social integration”, empowering weaker individuals to 
 
into society’ or a ‘genuine link’ with the host state which can be established if they have resided in the Member 
State for a certain period of time. See Collins ibid.; Bidar ibid.; Judgment of 18 November 2008, Jacqueline 
Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, Case C-158/07, ECR I-08507, ECLI:EU:C:2008:630. 
93 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Treaty of Lisbon (Judgment) (30 June 2009) 2 BvE2/08, para. 259; 
Daniel Thym ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically 
Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 17, 31. 
94  Judgment of 2 June 2016, European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands, Case C-233/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:396, para. 75 (hereinafter ‘Commission v Netherlands’). 
95 See Francis G Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 591, 592. 
96 See Shuibhne (n 12) 890. 
97 See in general, Koen Lanaerts, ‘European Union Citizenship, National Welfare Systems and Social Solidarity’ 
(2011) 18 Jurisprudence 397.  
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live in conditions of dignity in the host state’. 98 Moreover, in her evaluation of the judgments, 
O’Brien has argued that they have the effect of reconstructing free movement rights as the 
corollary of class. She concludes that the Court prioritises free movement and equal treatment 
for ‘capitalist-class workers’ and leaves the ‘working proletariat at great risk of poverty’.99 The 
case law of the CJEU however does not marginalise less profitable activities given that the 
status of worker includes those who work on zero-hour contracts (Levin), receive below the 
national minimum wage (Nolte, Kempf, Bernini) and receive remuneration in kind (Trojani).100 
Significantly therefore, the exercise of EU citizenship rights is not reserved for those who are 
financially independent or ‘well-off’, but allows persons such as the claimants in the 
abovementioned circumstances to exercise their free movement rights, including an entitlement 
to receive welfare support by the host State in light of the principle of equal treatment.  
 
Despite the broad interpretation of ‘worker’ which enhances free movement, it should be 
recalled that the Directive aims to strike a balance between two divergent policy goals, that is, 
the facilitation of transnational mobility and the prevention of an unreasonable burden on the 
domestic welfare states in order to preserve their effectiveness.101 With regard to the latter, the 
Lisbon Treaty makes a clear distinction between the Union’s competencies on welfare rights 
and economic freedoms. According to Article 153(4) TFEU, the EU has no competence on 
social security and shall not affect the fundamental principles and financial equilibrium of the 
national social security systems. More significantly however, these opposing policy objectives 
do not merely reflect a conflict between individual rights and state interests in controlling 
public finances. They provide room for accommodating the different ‘paradigms of social 
ordering’102 that shape the function and organisation of welfare systems in Member States. In 
light of this, it is not possible to discern a universal right to social assistance for EU citizens 
under EU law,103 but a particularistic interpretation based on technical grounds which do not 
raise stable expectations of social solidarity in Europe.104 The Court therefore defers to EU 
 
98  Iliopoulou-Penot (n 75) 1021 (footnotes in original excluded). See however, Ferdinand Wollenschläger, 
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ECLI:EU:C:2004:488. 
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Protection, Case C-483/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:309. 
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Security Systems (29 April 2004) OJ L166/1 and Commission v UK (n 17) para. 63. 
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394. A clear illustration of the particularistic interpretation of the right to receive social benefits in the host state 
is the decisions in the Judgment of 4 October 2012, European Commission v Republic of Austria, Case C-75/11, 
EU:C:2012:605 and in Commission v Netherlands (n 94). On a first reading of the two judgments, the Court 
arrives at opposite conclusions in relation to the exact same type of social assistance relating to reduced transport 
fares for students. However, the technical conditions of the assistance schemes under national law proved to be 
the determinant factor in the reasoning of the Court. It is worth noting that the interpretation of the students’ 
entitlement to receive such benefits based on the principle of equal treatment was, in each case, dependent on the 
	 20	
legislation and to the national referring courts in order to preserve legal certainty and the rule 
of law. This is even demonstrated in the decision in Grzelczyk in which the CJEU referred to 
the existence of a ‘certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of the host Member 
State and nationals of other Member States.’105 While this appeared to be a step towards 
universalising a social vision of EU citizenship, the Court carefully presented a narrow 
interpretation of financial solidarity that is confined to cases where the difficulties of an 
applicant are not long-term. In doing so, the Court identified the possibility of restrictions in 
the exercise of rights derived from EU citizenship.106 The restrictions and the balance, which 
is reflected in EU citizenship law and continuously reviewed on a case-by-case basis, are most 
lucidly exemplified in Dano. 
 
Had the Court taken the view that EU citizenship encompassed social solidarity in the form of 
guaranteeing social allowances to economically inactive persons residing in a host Member 
State, it would have tilted the application of the concept of EU citizenship in favour of 
redistribution of resources to assist Union citizens. According to the CJEU, a system of social 
welfare is based on social solidarity if it:  
is designed as a matter of priority to assist those who are in a state of need owing to insufficient family 
income, total or partial lack of independence or the risk of being marginalized, and only then, within the 
limits imposed by the capacity of the establishments and resources available, to assist other persons who are, 
however, required to bear the costs thereof, to an extent commensurate with their financial means, in 
accordance with scales determined by reference to family income.107  
As such conception of social solidarity carries with it decisions on the redistribution of 
resources and necessitates competencies on general taxation and social assistance, the CJEU 
has repeatedly confirmed that the preservation of economic viability and financial balance is a 
legitimate aim pursued by the Member States as a derogation from the right to free movement. 
This approach was not first introduced in Dano; the Court had previously emphasised that the 
financial responsibility incurred by the host Member States towards EU nationals should be 
interpreted flexibly in order not to unsettle the capacity and management of domestic welfare 
systems.108 In Dano however, a concrete illustration of such an approach was provided possibly 
for the first time and the boundaries of citizenship law were clearly demarcated. Especially 
relevant here is the empirical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence after the financial crisis by 
Šadl and Madsen as it highlights that there is no evidence of a shift in the treatment of EU 
citizens and their access to social assistance. The authors argue that the CJEU’s interpretation 
of primary and secondary citizenship law continues to lead to pro-individual outcomes in the 
 
variations of the regulatory framework that the state had opted for and not on the normative disposition of the 
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category of social advantages granted to EU citizens and does not indicate a reversal in its 
approach. They further observe that the Court demonstrates deference to national courts 
concerning the determination of factual circumstances on the status of claimants as workers 
and concepts such as that of sufficient resources. 109  Significantly however, it cannot be 
concluded that the Court has changed the core aspects of citizenship law by merely allowing a 
degree of leeway to the EU legislature and to domestic authorities to decide on the factual 
particularities of the case. 
The promotion of social policy could be institutionalised at the EU level via the implementation 
of a comprehensive welfare system scheme for EU citizens, thereby creating a minimum safety 
net common to all citizens. Potential redistributive policies generated by the case law or put in 
place by EU institutions would necessitate risk pooling at the Union level, alongside common 
unemployment regulation and minimum requirements on the quality of the welfare systems of 
Member States (for example, requirements on activation and coverage of allowance) in order 
to guarantee their stability and effectiveness.110 As follows however, the lack of recognition of 
a right to social assistance to economically inactive persons is not associated with the neoliberal 
orientation of EU citizenship, as O’Brien argues, but with the territorial fragmentation of the 
welfare systems and their retained capacity to address redistribution policies on the basis of 
available resources. The Court accepts the multiplicity of domestic welfare states and their 
historical and cultural embeddedness despite the Europeanisation of the economic and legal 
spheres,111 and provides a clear avenue for integration of citizens in a flexible system of 
governance in the EU. It thus acts as a mediator of the national rules on social benefits, the 
social ordering of welfare systems in Member States and EU law on citizenship. 
 
3.3  A Corrective Form of Solidarity in the EU 
 
The question of the place and function of solidarity in the Union is not merely confined to 
citizenship law. It remains central to broader policy debates on future reforms in the Eurozone 
area in order to reinforce financial stability and deliver growth. The sovereign-debt crisis 
changed political causality between those responsible for the governance dysfunctions within 
some Member States and those responsible for providing financial assistance. If the roots to 
the crisis were located in some Member States, other Members States and EU institutions 
assumed a central role in addressing such failures. Hence, externalities of domestic governance 
failures and political accountability for the response measures were diffused to the whole of 
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the Eurozone area.112 In addition, structural shortcomings in the design of the monetary union 
were brought to the fore as ‘blind spots’ in the Union’s economic system that contributed to 
the crisis, and the absence of stabilising response mechanisms fuelled the rise of populism and 
nationalism in Member States. On the one hand, proposals premised on a broad view of social 
solidarity suggest more effective risk sharing among Member States and longer-term 
redistribution mechanisms supported by the establishment of a common budget for the 
Eurozone area and social contributions that would go towards a solidarity fund for less wealthy 
countries.113 On the other hand, a focus on stronger enforcement tools of fiscal responsibility 
and on market discipline is favoured by others to avoid permanent transfers and the moral 
hazard.114  
 
From the considerations developed here it follows that a soft version of solidarity as a 
corrective mechanism can be conceived in order to deal with problems of protracted 
socioeconomic stagnation in Member States.115 Such a conceptualisation of solidarity fits well 
within a system of European governance based on systemic differentiation because it seeks to 
exert external pressure on the Union’s economic system in order to address excessive growth 
compulsions and to render it responsive to its environment. It aims to rectify structural causes 
both in the Eurozone and in Member States that contribute to asymmetric risks and 
opportunities among the euro area Member States116 without prescribing a political rationality 
to the economic constitution and curbing its autonomy. In turn, ‘corrective’ solidarity would 
safeguard the diversity of national welfare states and strengthen the capacity of domestic 
authorities to design viable social policies. Measures that have already been implemented, such 
as supervision of national budgets and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, and others 
that have been adopted in some Member States such as the National Productivity Boards117 
should be seen as part of a wider framework that benefits individual states and facilitates the 
wider goals of sustainable development of Europe’s integration. Solidarity therefore 
encompasses a flexible policy toolbox which aims to manage risks by improving governance 
in each Member State and the EU as a whole ‘in order to create an environment of mutual trust, 
contributing to further development of mutual assistance.’118  
 
4. Solidarity through the Prism of the Covid-19 pandemic 
 
The recent EU responses to the economic crisis that is precipitated by the pandemic cast old 
questions under new light.119 Should, for example, the most appropriate instruments to deal 
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with the economic consequences include debt mutualisation with joint liability? Or should they 
be underpinned by conditionality-based measures under the European Stability Mechanism? 
Indeed, the parallels of the policy debates regarding the requisite degree of risk mutualisation 
with earlier calls for debt restructuring and burden-sharing during the Eurozone crisis are 
obvious. Even though the pandemic has been a symmetric shock across all Member States, its 
economic effects are asymmetric depending on, among others, the initial conditions of domestic 
economies, the available room for fiscal policy responses and the impact of the containment 
measures on specific sectors.120 Solidarity - and the extent to which it should underpin the EU 
responses - has therefore featured once again as a central principle in legal debates. 
Assumptions of its normative reach often shape the tone of the debate.121  
 
At the domestic level, Member States adopted emergency welfare measures at an 
unprecedented speed and scale. Italy, France, Germany and Spain for instance introduced work-
schemes to support the payment of employees’ salaries whose working hours have been reduced 
or suspended; while Spain also provided a means-tested minimum income guarantee and a 
relaxation of the conditions of contributory unemployment benefits. From the perspective of 
EU economic integration, the domestic policies clearly demonstrate  - and risk exacerbating - 
the divergences between Member States and put the single market under severe strain: while in 
some countries the measures are so far limited to providing emergency aid, in Germany a fiscal 
stimulus package has been made available to hasten the country’s economic recovery.122  
 
Against this backdrop of national stimulus policies, the EU’s recovery plan has offered a way 
forward for an ambitious and large-scale programme that combines the ‘Next Generation EU’ 
instrument of non-repayable contributions and loans to Member States with other support 
packages. One aspect of the recovery plan that is of particular relevance to the foregoing 
discussion is the instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an 
emergency (SURE) that has been adopted by the Council.123 The financial assistance under 
SURE comes in the form of loans to Member States to combat unemployment through short-
term work schemes, that is, where national expenditure has increased suddenly in order to 
compensate workers for the hours not worked in case their working hours are reduced or 
suspended (Preamble, paragraph 7, and Articles 1 and 2). The Commission has the power to 
raise the resources from capital markets and to distribute them as loans to Member States which, 
in return, provide voluntary guarantees proportional to their relative share to the total gross 
national income of the Union. The measure will enable Member States to better alleviate the 
impact of the pandemic on domestic labour markets by helping employees retain their jobs and 
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At the time of writing, it is still be very early to arrive at concrete conclusions on whether the 
EU responses to the crisis will lead to any structural changes. SURE constitutes a ‘tangible 
expression of Union solidarity’124 according to the Commission, and this raises the question 
whether it is a step towards an effective compensation system for individuals in European 
society. SURE reflects the form of ‘corrective’ solidarity discussed above. This is so for two 
main reasons. Firstly, by supporting those Member States whose expenditure has increased 
suddenly, SURE contributes to the overall rationale of reducing the risk that divergences 
between Member States are aggravated. The financial assistance for States mostly in need seeks 
to provide redress for their asymmetric losses within the structures of cooperation and 
interdependence in the Union; and at the same time it is temporary and remedial in nature in 
order to tackle direct socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic.125 Second, as is clear from 
its scope, SURE does not establish an unemployment insurance scheme at the EU level. It takes 
place outside the remit of EU citizenship and does not have an impact on the EU law rights 
conferred to EU citizens. The short-term nature of the instrument, moreover, and its legal basis 
under Article 122 TFEU would suggest that the financial aid does not extend beyond situations 
of unemployment that are not related to the pandemic. 
 
From the prism of the Covid-19 pandemic therefore, a spirit of ‘corrective’ solidarity as 
generated under the sphere of European integration can be traced in the adopted measures. It 
has taken a meaningful form in the practice of financial assistance that is necessary in order to 
increase the room for fiscal policy in Member States and to redress their asymmetries in their 
capacity to provide emergency programmes and to manage their longer-term economic 
recovery. ‘Corrective’ solidarity, thus, serves the strategic objectives of the Union and, by 
relying on its hetararchically organised interrelationships, enhances its resilience so that its 





It has been argued in this chapter that EU citizenship represents a constitutional status of EU 
citizens as stakeholder constituents of the Union’s economic system and that the CJEU has 
advanced a conception of EU citizenship that is compatible with the systemic differentiation 
of European governance. While more clarity on the rights of economically inactive citizens 
with respect to social benefits would be desirable, the Court has taken a step towards certainty 
by applying the clear rules under the Directive relating to economically inactive citizens with 
no sufficient resources and no intention of seeking employment, unemployed persons 
previously working in the host state for less than a year and economically inactive persons in 
the first three months of residence. Such an interpretation does not contradict previous case 
law on students and jobseekers and, more importantly, does not prevent the Court from 
providing free movement-friendly judgments and from applying the proportionality test in 
situations that are left open or are not exhaustively determined by secondary legislation.126 
 
In this light, the CJEU has supported the preservation of self-regulatory capacity of Member 
States over their welfare systems to manage a degree of separate treatment between 
 
124 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of SURE’ (2 April 2020) 
COM(2020) 139, 2. 
125 For example, SURE includes a sunset clause and is available until December 2022 (Article 12). For the 
temporary increase in the ceiling of the EU’s own resources, European Commission, ‘Amended Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the System of Own Resources of the EU’ (28 May 2020) COM(2020) 445. 
126 See Wollenschläger (n 98) 190. See Jobcenter Krefeld (n 104). 
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economically active and inactive persons to the extent that it offers a measured response for a 
long-term sustainable open migration policy of Member States.127 By clarifying the parameters 
of EU citizenship and removing barriers to market access and to integration in the labour 
markets of host States, the Court makes a contribution to a jurisprudence that avoids a one-
sided orientation towards either the formulation of a collective social order or excessive 
deference to domestic authorities. 
 
127 See Achilles Skordas, ‘Immigration and the Market: The Long-Term Residents Directive’ (2006) 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 201, 226; Robin Ca White, ‘Free Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizenship of the 
Union’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 885. 
